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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PARK CITY, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
SAM LEVY, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
I Appeal No. 20000610-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from Defendant's conviction of driving while under the influence 
of alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(1953 as amended), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Division II, Park City Department, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Judge Pat Brian, presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3 (1953 as amended). 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There are two issues presented in this appeal. 
1. Did the trial court fail to comply with Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, selection of a jury and Rule 4-404, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, jury 
selection, by obtaining law enforcement personnel and court clerks from the Summit 
County Courthouse building as prospective jurors rather than summoning jurors from a 
qualified list? Regarding this issue, the standard is whether the trial court substantially 
failed to comply with Rule 4-404, Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure, and Rule 18, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and whether substantial injustice and prejudice 
resulted. State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Did the trial court misinterpret Utah law and incorrectly bar evidence on the 
absorptive and metabolic rate of alcohol under Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1999)? Regarding this issue the standard is,"[w]hether a statute imposes a presumption is 
a question of statutory interpretation and, therefore, a question of law reviewed for 
correctness." State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are compiled in an 
appendix where not set forth in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Samuel A. Levy, was charged with driving under the influence of 
alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(a). Defendant pled not guilty and a 
jury trial was set. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Park City alleged that Defendant, Samuel A. Levy ("Mr. Levy") committed 
the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol in Park City on the evening of 
February 6, 1999. (Transcript p.4 lines 17-22). 
2. The prosecution offered Scott Buchanan ("Buchanan"), from the Park City 
Police Department, as the city's witness. (Transcript p.5 lines 6-7). 
3. Mr. Levy, his wife, Dana Levy ("Mrs. Levy") and Denny Crouch 
("Crouch") were offered as witnesses by the Defense. (Transcript p.5 lines 16-18). 
4. After the 11 prospective jurors were sworn in and the court had finished 
with preliminary jury qualification questions the jury panel proceeded to voir dire 
examination. (Transcript p.3-4; p.6 lines 8-25 through p.7 lines 1-10). 
5. The court then asked the prospective jurors: "Are any of you acquainted 
with any law enforcement officer? That is, you personally knowing someone who is in 
the Park City Police Department, the Summit County Sheriffs Office, the Utah Highway 
Patrol, the FBI, the DEA, the CIA, anybody who is in law enforcement[?]" (Transcript 
p.20 lines 21-25 through p.21 lines 1-2). 
6. Juror 11 was excused for cause after conceding that discussions with her 
ex-husband, a former employee of the Los Angeles Police Department, would impugn 
her impartiality in this trial. (Transcript p.23 lines 14-25 through p.24 lines 1-22). 
7. Juror 9 was excused for his experience with a past D.U.I (Transcript p. 28 
lines 8-25 through p.29 lines 1-15). 
8. The court admonished the prospective jurors about the Constitutionally 
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time-honored principle that the defendant's presumption of innocence remains until the 
defendant's guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then asked if anyone 
did not understand or agree with this fundamental presumption. Juror 3 and Juror 7 
participated in separate side-bar conferences and Juror 3 was excused for cause. 
(Transcript p.33 lines 1-25 through p.34 lines 1-25). 
9. The court asked whether any of the prospective jurors would be swayed by 
a police officer s testimony simply by virtue of the witness's position as a law 
enforcement officer and implored that the jury impartially "apply the same yardstick" to 
measure the credibility of all of the witnesses. (Transcript p.34 lines 16-25, p.3 5 lines 1-
25 through p.36 lines 1-24). 
10. At this point in the jury selection process only eight prospective jurors 
remained and if both counsel had exercised their three peremptory challenges then the 
jury pool would have been reduced to an inadequate number. The prosecutor suggested 
that the Defendant waive some the Defense's peremptory challenges. The Defendant 
refused. As well, the prosecution would not waive two preemptory challenges so that the 
existing panel could be utilized. (Transcript p.79 lines 15-25 through p.80 lines 1-10). 
11. The court instructed the bailiff to find more prospective jurors: "You can go 
to the clerk's office, go to the sheriffs office, go over to the industrial building and you 
bring me four more jurors post haste." (Transcript p.37 lines 11-15). 
12. The bailiff went through the courthouse only and returned with four 
prospective jurors, all of whom worked in the Summit County Courthouse building: 
Jurors 12 and 13, Summit County Justice Court Clerks; Juror 14, a Summit County 
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Dispatcher; and, Juror 15, a Summit County Deputy Sheriff. (Transcript p.39 line 16; 
p.41 line 12; p.42 lines 5-7; p.42 lines 5-6, 18-23). 
13. Except for Juror 14, the county dispatcher, all of the prospective jurors had 
prior working relationships with prosecutor Christiansen and defense counsel D'Elia. In 
addition, Juror 13's father was a Summit County Sheriffs Sergeant and Juror 15 was a 
veteran Summit County Sheriff with 23 years under his belt. (Transcript p.43 lines 11-25; 
p.44 lines 1-22; p.47 lines 8-9; p.58 lines 21-24). 
14. The court noted for the record that all of the prospective jurors shared "a 
livelihood in law enforcement." After questioning the group collectively as to their 
impartiality as jurors the court passed them on to counsel for any reasonable questions. 
(Transcript p.50 lines 21-25; p.51 lines 2-9, 25; p.52 lines 1-3). 
15. It was established through voir dire that Juror 15, Deputy Sheriff Judd, had 
dealt with the arresting officer and prosecution witness, Buchanan, in a professional 
setting and had formed an opinion as to his credibility. Deputy Sheriff Judd was 
dismissed for cause. (Transcript p.62 lines 9-16; p. 63 lines 11-14). 
16. The prosecution passed the jury for cause. The Defense took exception to 
the three prospective jurors pulled from the Summit County Courthouse building and 
Juror 7 who had previously expressed reservations concerning a defendant's 
Constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. (Transcript p.74 lines 4-13; p.94 
lines 5-17). 
17. Regarding the three Summit County employees, the Defendant argued that 
while it may be appropriate to choose prospective jurors from a qualified jury list or bring 
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them in off of the street, it is not appropriate to select jurors solely from the Justice Court 
Center and the Sheriffs Department. The Defense explained that, inter alia, the close 
working relationships in the Summit County building would cause the jurors to be partial 
to the prosecution's testimony. (Transcript p.80 lines 11-16; p.87 lines 5-15; p.88 lines 5-
13). 
18. The Defendant contended that under the United States Constitution and the 
Utah Constitution, in the interests of fairness and due process rights, the two court clerks 
and the dispatcher —Jurors 12, 13, and 14— should be excused for cause, correctly 
reserving the Defense's peremptory challenges for the properly selected jurors. 
(Transcript p.89 lines 3-25 through p.90 line 1; p. 87 lines 21-24). 
19. After noting the Defense's objections to Jurors 7, 12, 13, and 14 the court 
asked the prosecution and the Defense to exercise their peremptory challenges. The jury 
ultimately was comprised of the three replacement jurors selected from the Summit 
County Justice Center and one original juror from the qualified jury list. (Transcript p.95 
lines 23-25; p.100 lines 24-25 through p.101 lines 1-11). 
20. As the trial proceeded a legal issue arose as to the admissibility of the 
Defense's witness, a forensic toxicologist, Denny Crouch, and his testimony as to the 
Defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of arrest. (Transcript p.105 lines 21-
25 through p. 106 1-25). 
21. The Defendant argued that under the prosecution's interpretation of Utah 
Criminal Code §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i), the statute's wording creates a conclusive presumption 
that can not be attacked on any grounds and is therefore unconstitutional. (Transcript p. 
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112 lines 20-25, p.l 13 lines 1-25 through p.l 14 lines 1-7). 
22. The court declared "that the statute clearly says that the question's not what 
the breathalyzer test was at the time of the stop, but what a breathalyzer test was within 
two hours of the stop." (Transcript p. 119 lines 2-6). 
23. The Defense proffered for the record that their expert witness would have 
testified that Mr. Levy had a blood alcohol concentration of less than .08 at the time of 
his arrest, based on his physical characteristics, and on the type and amount of alcohol 
consumed. (Transcript p. 120 lines 23-25 through p. 121 lines 1-13). 
24. The court sustained the prosecution's objection and barred any expert 
testimony relevant to the Defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the stop. 
(Transcript p. 127 lines 1-25). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Under the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration Rule 4-404( 10), calling 
additional jurors, the trial court is mandated to exhaust all reasonable efforts to summon 
additional jury members from a qualified jury list before resorting to extraordinary 
means, in order to ensure uniformity and administrative accountability of jury selection. 
2. The amended version of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999), driving 
under the influence of alcohol, as interpreted by the trial court is unconstitutional because 
it invokes a conclusive presumption. 
Defendant argued that he could not be found guilty for two reasons. 
1. The Utah Legislature's intent is clear and unambiguous in Rule 4-404 and 
the mandatory jury selection procedure is obvious from the language used in the statute's 
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construction. As a matter of policy the trial court's rogue jury selection procedure 
undermined the intent of the legislature to ensure uniformity and administrative 
responsibility in the jury selection process. It was a substantial departure from proper jury 
selection for the trial court to immediately deviate from the qualified jury list and select 
additional jurors exclusively from the Justice Court office and Sheriffs office. 
2. Under Utah law a statute that triggers an irrebuttable presumption is 
unconstitutional. The Defendant has a right to attack a presumption on any grounds. The 
trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) was incorrect and the 
Defendant had a right to introduce evidence on the absorptive and metabolic rates of 
alcohol to prove his innocence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH 
UTAH RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 4-404 (10) AND RULE 18 UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CAUSED SUBSTANTIAL INJUSTICE AND 
PREJUDICE TO MR. LEVY. 
The trial court failed to substantially comply with Utah law by calling additional 
jurors exclusively from the Summit County Justice Center instead of from a qualified 
jury list and caused substantial injustice and prejudice to Defendant, Mr. Levy. 
(Transcript at 84). 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-404 (1992), jury selection and 
service, states as part of its Intent: "To establish a uniform procedure for jury selection, 
qualification, atnd service [and] [t]o establish administrative responsibility for jury 
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selection." The procedure for calling additional jurors states: 
If there is an insufficient number of prospective jurors to fill all jury 
panels, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to summon from the 
qualified jury list such additional jurors as necessary. The clerk shall make 
every reasonable effort to contact the prospective jurors in the order 
listed on the qualified jury list. 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-404( 10) (1992) [emphasis]. 
Only after the trial court has exhausted all reasonable efforts at contacting jurors from the 
qualified jury list, "the court may use any lawful method for acquiring a jury." Id. 
[emphasis]. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 18 (e)(4) (1999) states that a challenge for 
cause may be taken against a juror for "[t]he existence of any ... relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party ... which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be 
unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism." [emphasis]. 
"The ordinary meaning of language should always be favored. The form of the 
verb used in a statute, i.e., something "may," "shall" or "must" be done, is the single most 
important textual consideration determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory." 
Sutherland Statutory Construction §57.03, at 7 (5th ed. 1992). Accord State in Interest of 
M.C. 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah App. 1997). In State in Interest of M.C. the Utah Court 
of Appeals concluded, "'[t]he term 'may,' means permissive,... 'shall,' on the other 
hand, 'is usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such previously in this 
and other jurisdictions.'" 940 P.2d at 1236 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 
659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983); see also Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 
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App. 1992)). 
In State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah App. 1990), the defendant challenged 
the trial court's use of jurors excused on the same day, by a different judge, to fill an 
unanticipated shortage of trial jurors. The Appellate Court interpreted Utah Code Ann. 
§78-46-13(4) (1987) (which was repealed in 1992 and replaced by Rule 4-404(10) of the 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration). The former statute stated, "[i]f there is an 
unanticipated shortage of available trial jurors drawn from a qualified jury wheel, the 
court may require the clerk of the court to summon a sufficient number of trial jurors 
[from the qualified jury list]." Suarez, 793 P.2d at 937 [emphasis original]. The Appellate 
Court stressed that the statute in Suarez was "couched in permissive terms and appear[ed] 
to give the court some discretion on how to make up a shortage of jurors." Id. 
Specifically the Appellate Court pointed out that the statute merely directs that the court 
may draw jurors from the jury wheel but does not require it to do so. The Suarez court 
held that "[t]he decision to utilize qualified, unused jurors who had been properly called 
to serve as jurors on that day . . . " was permissible and was not a substantial departure 
from proper jury selection. Id at 938. 
In the case at bar the trial court's use of jurors from the Summit County Justice 
Center, instead of jurors selected from a qualified jury list, constitutes a substantial 
departure from proper jury selection and less than a lawful method of acquiring a jury. In 
Suarez the jury selection statute afforded the trial court discretion by stating that in the 
event that jurors can not be selected from a qualified jury list then the court may require 
the clerk to draw more jurors from a qualified jury wheel. Here, the current statute, Rule 
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4-404(10), orders the trial court that it shall draw additional jurors from a qualified jury 
list and shall exhaust all reasonable efforts to call additional jurors from a qualified jury 
list before resorting to extraordinary means. In this case there is nothing on the record to 
show that the clerk of the court made any attempt to exhaust efforts to use jurors from the 
qualified list before resorting to the most irregular method of pulling potential jurors from 
the court office and the Sheriffs office. (Transcript at 37). The language of the jury 
selection statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislature's intent is obvious from the 
language used that the Utah Legislature wanted to ensure "uniformity" and 
"administrative responsibility" for the jury selection process. As a matter of policy the 
trial court should be held to the procedure mandated in Rule 4-404 in order to ensure Due 
Process. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 18, selection of jury, stresses that it is 
proper to challenge a juror for cause when that prospective juror's relationship to persons 
involved in a trial would suggest favoritism. In the case at bar the jury panel was 
manipulated by the court so that of the additional panel members, all were Summit 
County employees from the same building that houses the trial court. In addition to one 
police officer, two were Summit County Justice Court clerks and one was a Summit 
County dispatcher, and all of them had close working relationships with law enforcement 
officials. (Transcript at 41-44). The trial court admitted for the record that, "the 
prospective jurors have a livelihood in law enforcement, working either as a clerk in the 
Justice of the Peace court or working as a dispatcher,... or working as a law 
enforcement officer." (Transcript at 50-51). Reasonable minds would conclude that jurors 
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enmeshed in the small law enforcement community in Summit County would be unable 
to make a decision^ee of favoritism. The propensity for bias clearly outweighs the trial 
court's necessity to resort to these additional jurors. A jury panel injected with a police 
officer, police dispatcher and Justice Court employees, who were selected by the court 
entirely from the close-knit Summit County law enforcement community, is a gross 
departure from Due Process. 
In State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503 (1997) the Utah Supreme Court adopted the cure-
or-waive rule holding that the defense must exercise a peremptory challenge if one exists 
against the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause in order to preserve the error on 
appeal. The cure-or-waive rule should not preclude this appeal because the trial court 
substantially departed from congressionally mandated jury selection procedures and 
vitiated their legislative intent. Justice Zimmerman's prescient dissent in Baker was 
written with this case in mind. In response to the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of the 
cure-or-waive rule and its possible negative consequences, Justice Zimmerman implored: 
We would be loath to create a mechanism that could be seen 
as giving trial judges the ability to force defendants to use all their 
peremptories to cure trial court refusals to strike biased jurors. 
This is completely inconsistent with the fact that empanelling impartial 
jurors is primarily the responsibility of the trial judge. 
Baker, 935 P.2d at 511. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT TWO 
UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) CREATES AN IRREBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER UTAH LAW. 
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The Utah Code Ann. §41 -6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999) was interpreted by the trial court to 
disallow any expert testimony based on the Defendant's rate of alcohol absorption or 
metabolism used to establish the Defendant's actual blood alcohol concentration at the 
time of arrest. The trial court's interpretation of the unconstitutional wording of the 
D.U.I, statute invokes an irrebuttable presumption and violates Utah law. (Transcript at 
120). 
The Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999) states: 
(2) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within 
two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater; 
The former statute stated: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control; 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i)(Supp. 1998). 
In State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1,6 (Utah App. 1998) the Appellate Court held "that 
the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to evidence on the absorptive and 
metabolic rates of alcohol." The Appellate Court reversed the defendant's conviction for 
driving with a blood/breath alcohol level above the statutory limit of .08 because,"[by] 
erroneously invoking a conclusive presumption, the trial court denied Preece the ability 
to challenge the [intoxilyzer] test's accuracy on the ground that he absorbed alcohol after 
he stopped driving." Id. at 7. The Appellate Court cited City of Orem v. Crandall, 760 
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P.2d 920, 923-924 (Utah App. 1988), to support its conclusion that Utah Code Ann. §41-
6-44(2) "was constitutional precisely because it carried no presumption ... and 
[therefore] the defendant is allowed to challenge the accuracy of the test on any relevant 
ground." Id. at 6 [internal brackets removed]. 
The case at bar and Preece share very similar fact patterns in that both defendants 
were stopped for lane violations, both had consumed alcohol only a short time before the 
stop, and both were later cited for driving under the influence of alcohol. (Transcript at 
103). Essentially the only difference is that here the Defendant, Mr. Levy, is being tried 
under the amended statute, Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999). The prosecution 
argued that the forensic toxicologist's testimony pertaining to Mr. Levy's absorptive and 
metabolic rates of alcohol was irrelevant by virtue of the conclusive statutory 
presumption set forth in §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i). (Transcript at 106). This is the same argument 
that was struck down in Preece where the Appellate Court stressed that the statute was 
only able to withstand constitutional scrutiny "precisely because it carried no 
presumption." Preece, 971 P.2d at 6. The trial court in this case misinterpreted Utah Code 
Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) and incorrectly barred Defendant's expert testimony challenging 
the accuracy of the intoxilyzer results. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant, Mr. Levy, should have his D.U.I, conviction reversed. 
The Defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's substantial departure from 
proper jury selection. The trial court did not adhere to the Utah Legislature's clear and 
unambiguous rules mandating jury selection procedures. 
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Utah Code Ann. §41 -6-44 (2)(a)(i) as interpreted and applied by the trial court is 
unconstitutional because it carries a conclusive presumption. 
Dated this £\ day of <S*P~^" _, 2000. 
D'ELIA & LEHMER 
GenAp'Elia 
Attorney for Appellant 
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7620 Royal Street East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 626 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (435) 645-7470 
Facsimile: (435) 649-4380 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II 
PARK CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
PARK CITY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAM LEVY 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on the 11* day of August, 1999, the Honorable Judge Pat 
B. Brian presiding, Summit County Attorney Terry Christiansen was present representing the State 
of Utah, and the Defendant appeared in person and was represented by Gerry D'Elia. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant has been convicted by a jury to the offense of 
Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and Unsafe Blood Alcohol Concentration. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant pays a fine in the amount of $1,500.00 on or before 
August 13,1999. 
m o? 2000 
^ \ f TKiPD DISTRICT C 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
Case No. 995500254 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ADDENDUM TO 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF was served via first class mail postage prepaid to the following: 
Park City Prosecutor 
Tom Daley 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, Utah 84060 
DATED this 28™ day of September, 2000. 
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